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“The danger is in the neatness of identifications.” 
Samuel Beckett, “Dante… Bruno. Vico.. Joyce” 
 
Although epigraphs may be amongst the final things an author considers, they are one of the first 
things that the reader encounters. Gerald Vizenor’s epigraphs at the beginning of Dead Voices—
as taken from Samuel Beckett, John Neihardt and Maurice Blanchot—seem to prepare the reader 
for a confluence of European postmodernism and Native American literature in the pages that 
follow. As such, the epigraphs function to provide a framework through which the novel can be 
viewed; they may even go so far as to recommend an appropriate framework through which the 
novel should be viewed.  
However, how does the epigraph gain signification? What exactly is meant by the 
signifier “Samuel Beckett” in this context? Where to place Beckett’s name has long been a 
source of contention, with the competing claims of modernism and postmodernism, or Irishness 
as opposed to a general (European) humanity, played out across some sixty years of Beckett 
scholarship. The question that Vizenor’s use of Beckett as an epigraph for Dead Voices raises is 
exactly which Beckett is being invoked? In turn, what does Vizenor’s relation with this Beckett 
mean for the novel itself? 
One immediate answer to the question of which Beckett is at play may be deduced from 
the inclusion of Maurice Blanchot amongst the epigraphs. Blanchot was one of the first French 
critics to recognise the importance of the novels of Beckett. In “Where now? Who now?”, a 1959 
essay in the Evergreen Review, Blanchot delineated a Beckett that would be influential on 
initially the French and subsequently the Anglophone reception of the works. Crucially, the 
Beckett that was delineated was one in whom delineation was precisely at issue, as was the 
supposed security of the name “Beckett.” Asking “who is this ‘I’ condemned to speak without 
respite” in The Unnamable, Blanchot claimed that “by a reassuring convention, we answer: it is 
Samuel Beckett” (143). Such reassurance is short-lived for although we “try to recover the 




security of a name, to situate the book’s ‘content’ at the stable level of a person,” the focus of the 
novel undermines such attempts as “the man who writes is already no longer Samuel Beckett but 
the necessity that has displaced him, dispossessed and dis-seized him, which has made him 
surrender to whatever is outside himself, which has made him a nameless being” (144). 
Ultimately, the voice of The Unnamable is one that inhabits “that neutral region where the self 
surrenders in order to speak, henceforth subject to words, fallen into the absence of time where it 
must die an endless death” (148). The Beckett that Blanchot gestures towards is one in which 
identity—however one might have characterised it—has been attenuated in the act of writing to 
such a degree that words take precedence over subjectivity; indeed the subject is only of words 
and in words or, as The Unnamable puts it “I’m in words, made of words” (104). 
Blanchot’s account can be seen as sketching out the case for a postmodern Beckett: a 
sketch that has now been fully rendered, if not entirely accepted. The stress on dispossession, 
displacement and the dis-seized also foreshadows Blanchot’s later contemplation on the prefix 
“dis” (dé) that runs throughout L’Ecriture du désastre and which provides the final epigraph of 
Dead Voices. The Writing of the Disaster recognises the “horror—and the honor—of the name, 
which always threatens to become a title” (7). (“Title” is the translation given of sur-nom, which 
Blanchot delicately balances with sur-vie, survival.) Naming may be attractive given a certain 
nostalgia for certainty, but it is ultimately a containment against which a literature of 
fragmentation must be deployed. Yet, in its oppositional structure, fragmentation may itself 
inadvertently provide a means of coherence. Hence, Blanchot warns: “The fragmentary promises 
not instability (the opposition of fixity) so much as disarray, confusion.” The fragmentary, which 
Blanchot recognised in Beckett, is always shadowed by the possibility of giving credit to its 
opposite; fixity. Even the dispossessed, displaced and dis-seized can fade into possession, 
placement and the seized. 
The Beckett-Blanchot axis of the epigraphs suggests that it is in a certain postmodern 
tradition that Dead Voices should be situated. Given Beckett’s and Blanchot’s “horror” at the 
name, it is ironic that their names are given such a position of authority within Vizenor’s work, 
but this might only be to yet further recognise the complexity of maintaining a discourse free of a 
restrictive subjectification. This is, of course, very much in keeping with Vizenor’s contention 
that “Postmodernism liberates imagination” and that the “trickster is postmodern” (Narrative 




Chance 9). However, one wonders if the postmodern is a single entity in and of itself, or a 
multiple site in which Vizenor and Beckett engage, or fail to do so. 
The site of that engagement is marked by the traces of Beckett’s The Unnamable 
throughout Dead Voices. The most obvious relation between the two novels that the epigraph 
commends is the fragmentary nature of the stories that Bagese tells and through which she 
embodies a series of tribal personas: bears, fleas, crows, beavers and so on. The Unnamable’s 
central consciousness—who necessarily remains unnamed—momentarily adopts, or is forced to 
adopt, a series of “avatars” or “vice-existers” whose stories are then related. At times he appears 
to be the creator of these “puppets” and at other times the victim of their narrative attempts to say 
him into existence. The novel moves between first and third person narration and the question of 
appropriate pronouns is as crucial to the text as it is in Dead Voices, as shall be seen. Hence, the 
Unnamable “is” Basil and then the decrepit tramp Mahood, who is later found limbless and stuck 
in a jar outside a chop-house near the shambles, and then the more enigmatic Worm whose 
precise nature is radically at issue. We are told that previous avatars include major figures from 
Beckett’s prior fiction, including Molloy, Malone, and Murphy from the novels Molloy, Malone 
Dies and Murphy respectively. Initially, this relation between the Unnamable and his vice-
existers bears some similarity to Bagese’s identities within the wanaki game.  Just as the 
Unnamable is Mahood “for the space of an instant” (27), so Bagese “is” Bear or Praying Mantis 
for the duration of their tales. When the wanaki game is described, the question of agency and 
responsibility seems untroubled:  
The player rises at dawn, turns one of the seven cards, meditates on the picture, and 
imagines he has become the animal, bird, or insect on the card of the day. Then 
stories are told about the picture and the plural pronoun we is used to be sure nature is 
not separated from humans in the wanaki game. (Dead Voices 28) 
To enter into the game is a willing act of the imagination in which one adopts the identity of the 
animal on the card, in an attempt, as Kimberly M. Blaeser has put it, to make a “reconnection 
with life through imaginative story” (192). The self is effectively suspended as the player adopts 
a position of mediation, reinforced by the choice of “we” as the governing pronoun which plays 
across strict boundaries of discrete identities. As such, there is a momentary dislocation of 
identity in the hope of a shared, beneficial experience.  




When one considers the problems the Unnamable has with pronouns, a very different 
tone and set of concerns emerge. At one stage, he abandons the first person as being “too 
farcical” (69), yet is unable to keep his resolve, realising that “...it’s the fault of the pronouns, 
there is no name for me, no pronoun for me, all the trouble comes from that, that, it’s a kind of 
pronoun too, it isn’t that either, I’m not that either, let us leave all that, forget about all that” 
(123). Rather than an acceptance of a voluntary “we,” the Unnamable rails against the inability 
of language to coalesce with his condition (one hesitates to say “identity”) coupled with the 
inevitability of language asserting some form of identity, even if it is merely a “that.” Indeed, his 
relation with his avatars is at times one in which he is coerced into accepting that he is they; a 
form of enforced “we” along the path of becoming an indissoluble “I.” In this sense the “we” of 
The Unnamable would also be a mediating position, but the effects of this mediation are 
repeatedly rejected throughout the novel. So, the Unnamable claims that all “these Murphys, 
Molloys and Malones do not fool me. They have made me waste my time, suffer for nothing, 
speak of them when, in order to stop speaking, I should have spoken of me and me alone” (14). 
In order to be brought into existence, the Unnamable must adhere to one of the stories of his 
delegates, accepting their words as his, or “pronouncing my own words, words pronouncing me 
alive, since that’s how they want me to be” (48). The stories of the delegates adopt a principle of 
degeneration to tempt the Unnamable into adherence, but he maintains his indifference, claiming 
that they “could clap an artificial anus in the hollow of my hand and still I wouldn’t be there, 
alive with their life, not far short of man, just barely a man, sufficiently a man to have hopes one 
day of being one, my avatars behind me” (27). Although the Unnamable claims from the outset 
to be alone, the discourse quickly posits not only the avatars who foist their stories and identities 
upon him, but also a mysterious “they” who are intent on bringing the Unnamable into being, 
usually with suffering functioning as a guarantee of existence. The “[t]hey say they, speaking of 
them, to make me think it is I whom am speaking” (86). This dialectical approach is one through 
which the Unnamable is coerced into taking up a subjective position—indeed, to become a 
subject as such—when he desires nothing more than to stop speaking: “Ah if only this voice 
could stop, this meaningless voice which prevents you from being nothing…” (87). Rather than 
the beneficial, communal “we” of Dead Voices, Beckett’s Unnamable is harried by a (possibly 




imaginary) “they” intent on coercing the voice of the protagonist into an identity which can then 
be assimilated into a “we.” 
However, Dead Voices is also aware of the coercive possibilities of exterior voices. In 
opposition to the wanaki “we” as employed in the “war with loneliness and with human 
separations from the natural world” (29), Bagese fears the “they” in the form of “the dead voices 
of civilization” (16). Throughout the novel, these dead voices threaten the immediacy of the 
wanaki game’s series of identities and the plural pronoun they promote. The “wordies” who 
wield these dead voices are inimical to the living voices of survivance and threaten to fracture 
the “we” of the game. For Blaeser, the “[t]rickster’s identity is itself a subversion of the Western 
mode of classification, resisting singularity…” (138), and, as such, a singular identity is to be 
resisted as being amenable to appropriation. So, Bagese as bear claims that “wordies held our 
name in isolation, even caged us on the page. We are bears not cold separations in the wilderness 
of dead voices” (31). To seize the name is to reify the fluidity of identity into one readily 
definable subjectivity that can then be studied, manipulated or (possibly most dangerously) 
dismissed. This claiming of the name is, of course, a question of power, as the metaphor of the 
hunter and prey makes clear: “We remember the world with stories that wordies would rush to 
discover, hunt, and capture in a name. The hunters pretend to own the world with names” (42). 
In Narrative Chance, Vizenor identifies these dead voices as those of the disciplines of the 
humanities and the social sciences: “The narrow teleologies deduced from social science 
monologues and the ideologies that arise from structuralism have reduced tribal literatures to an 
‘objective’ collection of consumable cultural artifacts” (5-6). The teleological aspect is crucial 
here. The drive towards an end-point from which something can be judged effectively curtails 
any form of continuance. Hence, in “Bears,” the narrator’s “mouth moves with dead voices. How 
can he be so young and so dead? […] How can he go on? He has no stories to remember because 
he asks us about our stories” (Dead Voices 31). Nicknamed the Laundry Boy because of the dead 
voice that is modern fastidious cleanliness, the narrator is unable to go on as his own stories have 
been subjected to the deadening effect of “civilized” voices and his querying of the wanaki 
stories suggests that the same deadening effect threatens their survival.  
In the matter of the dead voices, two related aspects of Beckett’s work can be discerned: 
remaining unnameable as a form of resistance to subjectification, and the question of 




continuance. The first aspect unearths a facet of Beckett that has often been downplayed: the 
political dimension. Beckett’s interventions in public political discourse were few and far 
between, and rarely unambiguous. A concern for the direction of travel of the Irish Free State in 
the 1930s led to some essays—such as “Censorship in the Saorstat” which condemned the wide-
ranging censorship law of the Free State—that combined a hope for literary freedom with wider 
social, religious and political freedoms. When the Left Review canvassed writers and artists for 
their opinions regarding the Spanish Civil War in 1937, Beckett submitted only 
“¡UPTHEREPUBLIC!” [sic]; quite a departure from the earnest submissions of Ford Madox 
Ford, Aldous Huxley and W.H. Auden and others in favour of the Republican government. After 
fighting with the resistance in Word War II, Beckett again seems to have made few overt 
political statements, although his private abhorrence of apartheid and other oppressive regimes 
has been attested to widely. The exception which one might say proves the rule would be the 
dedication of Catastrophe to the then dissident author, Vaclav Havel. In part because of the 
apparent lack of any obvious engagement with the wider political world, until the late 1990s it 
was almost a critical consensus that Beckett was an apolitical writer. Indeed, Peter Boxall has 
argued that up until that point 
Beckett’s cultural capital in the west has been amassed on the back of his apoliticism. 
His value as a writer is directly related to his widely perceived ability to give aesthetic 
expression to a condition that precedes and underlies being in the socio-political 
world. […] That he seems to offer a writing which can reach the limits of non-
specificity, which can speak so generally about the pre- or trans-cultural truths of 
being, has been read as confirmation that art can do something that isn’t political, that 
transcends the political, that puts the political in its place. (208) 
The apolitical view of Beckett could not be further removed from the deeply politically engaged 
work of Vizenor, in, for example, his framing of the constitution for the White Earth Nation. The 
activist Vizenor would appear to be some distance from the aesthetic Beckett. However, one 
should not forget that before such activism, Vizenor was often criticised for not being 
sufficiently engaged in practical political struggles. Craig Womack, for example, argues that 
practical political intervention might be marred by the style of writing adopted by figures such as 
Vizenor. Womack questions the “relevance of an inaccessible prose style toward intervening in 




the real world” in which injustices towards Native peoples are rife. For Womack, the fluidity of 
identity within a book such as Dead Voices fails to realise that “Native literature […] is a part of 
sovereignty” (Red on Red 72). As such, Womack argues that postmodern style is a barrier to 
political action in the name of sovereignty. However, one could counter that for Vizenor and 
Beckett, style is precisely political, as David Carlson has argued for Vizenor: “debates about 
whether political concerns should trump aesthetic ones in critical assessments of Vizenor are, in 
fact, misguided; his aesthetic is […] deeply political” (14). Indeed, it is in the frame of style and 
the political that Beckett’s importance for Vizenor might ultimately lie, and it is a frame bound 
together with a notion of resistance. Michel Foucault, writing in the Foreword for Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, in which Beckett is frequently referenced, argues that “the strategic 
adversary is fascism. […] And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini 
[…] but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that 
causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us” (xiii).  
In order to counter such a fascistic love of power, Beckett—whose work is repeatedly 
marked by impotence and failure—struggled with the basis of such a love; the process of 
subjectification itself. Terry Eagleton has argued that “in a world after fascism, self-affirmation 
has too sinister an infinity with mass murder. It is as though all action after Auschwitz is 
garbage. Better to suffer the pains of self-dispossession than court the perils of dominion” (xxiv), 
and that, for Beckett, “the word ‘perhaps’ is an anti-fascist weapon” (xxv). Such a fear of 
becoming a subject can be seen in the Unnamable’s refusal to be seized by any of the narratives 
and identities that are told of him, thus allowing him to retain his unnameable status as 
something proper to him but which cannot be defined as a subject. This refusal to enter into the 
name and thereby assume an identity is maintained throughout the novel, leaving the Unnamable 
still “on the threshold of my story, before the door that opens on my story, that would surprise 
me, if it opens, it will be I, it will be the silence, where I am…” (134).  
Such a refusal is double in nature: firstly, the Unnamable will not be subjected to violent 
appropriation and, secondly, he will not be responsible for the violent appropriation of another. 
“All these Murphys, Molloys and Malones” are imagined as a distraction from supposedly 
speaking of the self, yet it is clear that the Unnamable is also responsible for the suffering of his 
avatars in his capacity as their creator: “I thought I was right in enlisting these sufferers of my 




pains. I was wrong. They never suffered my pains, their pains are nothing, compared to mine, a 
mere tittle of mine, the tittle I thought I could put from me, in order to witness it” (14). So the 
Unnamable foists suffering on to his characters in order to better assess that suffering, yet that 
process of witnessing indicates a return of the suffering to its source, as if getting to know the 
suffering of the avatars will lead the Unnamable to a better understanding of his own condition. 
Crucially, the Unnamable denies this return and throughout the novel the lines of relation are 
fraught and often highly ambiguous, if not improbable. Rather than accepting identification 
based on a shared suffering, no matter to what degree, the Unnamable denies such an 
identification through an assertion of difference. This refusal to give assent might, as Anthony 
Uhlmann has argued, be “one way in which […] processes of subjection and enslavement might 
be resisted” (66).  
Similar aspects to Beckett’s ethical and political aesthetic can be heard to echo 
throughout Vizenor’s novel and can be seen to coalesce in a single paragraph in the chapter 
entitled “Voices”: 
There are more bears at the tables in the town than there are on the reservation. Our 
animals and stories have been hunted down to the last sanctuaries in the cities. The 
choice is between the chance of tricksters and the drone of cultural pride on 
reservations. The tribes were invented by these word demons who hunted our animals 
and buried our voices. The tribes are dead voices. We must go on, but there is nothing 
to be done. (136) 
The final sentence is an amalgam of Beckett texts: “We must go on” echoes the “I can’t go on, 
I’ll go on” which closes The Unnamable, whilst “nothing to be done” is a refrain from Waiting 
for Godot, initially made in reference to Estragon’s ill-fitting boots, but also later used in 
reference to Vladimir’s hat. Less obvious is the passage’s Beckettian fear of the reification of 
subjectivity. In keeping with Vizenor’s comment that “social science monologues and the 
ideologies that arise from structuralism have reduced tribal literatures to an ‘objective’ collection 
of consumable cultural artifacts” (Narrative Chance 5-6), the tribe itself is here seen as an 
imposition of restrictive subjectivity. The tribe is circumscribed by some supposed essence—
hence Vizenor’s claim that this arises from structuralism—which, whilst recognising the 
existence of the tribe as such, thereby condemns the tribe to a bound, locatable identity.  




The question of location is an important one. Writing against a form of “blurry and limp 
hybridity” (205) in theoretical readings of tricksters figures, Daniel Morley Johnson has 
highlighted the emphasis of place in Vizenor’s use of trickster stories, arguing that Vizenor 
repeatedly allies trickster hermeneutics to “the tribal-national, the situated-ness of Indigenous 
knowledges in nations, homelands—in Anishinaabe people” (207). In contrast, Blaeser has 
emphasised the key to Vizenor’s trickster consciousness as “vitality, adaptability, continuance” 
(143), and “the creation of the place they will call home” (148 my emphasis), suggesting that 
location is achieved through the stories rather than a fixed resource from which the stories arise. 
In Dead Voices, rather than identifying the tribe with a specific, supposedly ancestral space, the 
stories of the novel are dislocated: they are both fragmentary and displaced into the modern city 
which one naively might have thought would have been inimical to the continuance of the tribal 
stories themselves. However, the alternative of a preservation of the stories within the 
reservation might only signal the decline of those stories into the dead cultural artefacts that 
Vizenor deplores. By displacing the stories onto the city, the deadening links to a culturally 
restricted locale are broken. A similar sense of displacement and dislocation also permeates The 
Unnamable. In order for identity to take hold of the Unnamable, he must be situated. He 
speculates that “since to me too I must attribute a beginning, if I could relate it to that of my 
abode” his beginning, and therefore identity, would be more assured (6). One notices that origin 
is as much a question of location as it is of chronology. Similarly, location is given due 
prominence in the series of questions which open the novel: “Where now? Who now? When 
now?” (1). “Who” cannot be answered unless the “Where” is identifiable. Unsurprisingly, then, 
the specifics of place within the novel seem contradictory as it combines recognisably Irish 
landscapes linked to Molloy with specific indicators of a French setting, such as the citing of the 
Rue de Brancion in the midst of Mahood’s tale. Just as the identity of the Unnamable cannot be 
seized, so the question of location is necessarily unanswerable as one is a facet of the other.  
 This relation between Beckett and Vizenor on the issue of location and identity suggests 
Vizenor intuited that what many regard as Beckett’s almost exemplary post-modernity needs to 
be viewed within a post-colonial context. To recognize Beckett’s Irishness—and in particular his 
Protestant minority status within an emerging Catholic inflected Free State—is not to limit him 
to a geographical, ethnic and social identity, but to assess how those limits informed his repeated 




attempts to undo such impositions in his works. Writing of Murphy, which sees the eponymous 
Irish protagonist undergoing voluntary exile in London as Beckett himself had done during 1934 
and 1935, Patrick Bixby has argued that: 
The signs of a nomadic, unsettled, and decentred subjectivity, Murphy’s 
perambulations transform his life story into an extended narrative of displacement 
that belies any grounded notions of personal or national identity and denies any 
passive victimization by the structures of socio-political power. (104) 
Beckett, who was in London to pursue a course of psychoanalysis under Wilfred Bion, appears 
to have experienced the very imposition of identity that his texts would later scrupulously undo. 
James Knowlson reports that Beckett “hated London and was infuriated by the patronising 
English habit of addressing him in the pubs and shops as ‘Pat’ or ‘Paddy’” (186). In the Letters, 
he laments the countryside around Dublin—although not Dublin itself—and a week-long sense 
of “relief and vitality” on returning to London in 1935 is rapidly replaced: “now I feel beyond 
description worthless, sordid and incapacitated” (245). Beckett’s escape from Dublin into an 
Irish-diaspora boarding house does not so much mean an escape from Irishness as a reaffirmation 
of Irishness; a reaffirmation which might be all the more irksome because it is imposed from the 
outside. All this is reflected in Murphy, not least when Murphy applies for a job as a chandler’s 
smart youth. The cockney chandlers comment that “’E don’t look rightly human to me […] not 
rightly” (50). One should hesitate here to compare the experiences of an individual to those of a 
collective, abstract notion such as Native peoples. However, such a hesitancy indicates the 
complex of problems associated with the imposition of a communal identity upon the individual 
which does not account for the particularities of that individual. Moreover, Beckett’s experience 
of classification as a stereotypical Irish “Paddy” is the experience of being classified according to 
an abstract notion of national identity that one does not recognise oneself. Certainly, the 
particularities of Irish and Native peoples’ experiences of imposed identity vary widely (both in 
comparison to each other and within the groups designated as Irish or Native peoples), yet the 
underlying structures of such an imposition remain to be read in similar terms in Beckett’s and 
Vizenor’s works and not least in the strategies to undo or avoid restrictive subjectivities in The 
Unnamable and Dead Voices. It is perhaps in this sense that we should treat Vizenor’s claim that 




he is “a hybrid document, unnamable on delivery” (Native Liberty 15); a claim that already puts 
Beckett’s sense of the unnamable within a post-colonial frame of reference. 
 If Vizenor’s and Beckett’s forms of resistance function to escape the imposition of 
coercive, subjectifying forces, one wonders why Vizenor claims in the very same paragraph that 
there is “nothing to be done”. If resistance is at stake, surely something must be done? Of course, 
one could define “nothing” as a positive, as a form of radical passivity towards those forces 
ranged against one. Alternatively, and more in keeping with the strategies of resisting restrictive 
subjectivities, one might ask from whose perspective nothing is indeed nothing? The Mantis 
story, which includes a wanaki-camouflaged bid for freedom through revolt, would seem to 
suggest that some form of physical resistance is necessary, yet the success of that revolt depends 
on the mantises being nothing in the mind of the female scientist they rebel against. Using the 
wanaki to access the flea and then the bear, the mantises succeed in being unidentifiable to the 
rational categorisations upon which the scientist depends: “She was so rational that if we were 
not wordies, or could not be seen in printed words, then we were not there at the end of the 
world” (86). From a rational perspective, the mantis-as-flea-as-bear is so multiple as to be no one 
thing, and so not amenable to appreciation and appropriation. On the level of the tribe, the drive 
towards categorisation entailed a further discipline of the dead voices; history. Hence, the 
rational anthropological history of the tribe that provides the mark of definition and makes the 
multiple into a single thing is to be feared. Two pasts are therefore played against each other in 
the novel; one of “history” and the other an alternative form of living continuance of stories as 
voices in the blood. “The past, not death, is our silence, because the past is the end of the war, 
the deception of peace. There is no past in the mirror, no past in stones or stories” (138-9). Of 
course, for a peace to be signed the warring parties must be indentified: one makes a treaty with 
a tribe or nation, not a multiple, complex identity which, quite literally, cannot be brought to 
book.  
To do nothing, in this sense, is to not do something which is definable by the very 
dominant discourses and ideologies that are ranged against one. Even accepting that we are the 
one against which such discourses are ranged is to accept a dangerous, identifiable position. With 
reference to a radical kenosis or “self-emptying” within his works, Eagleton argues that, for 
Beckett, one cannot react against the crimes of Stalinism and fascism “with vigorous actions of 




your own […], since to do so would be to remain within the same noxious frame of reference, 
make a move within the same lethal game” (xxiv). As with Vizenor’s form of resistance, there is 
a refusal of the dubious solace of adopting an oppositional position to what is being fought; 
instead, a strategic evasion of the terms of the conflict as such is adopted. In a similar fashion to 
Vizenor’s mistrust of the languages of the social sciences, so the Unnamable is ultimately not 
amenable to the application of reason and the rhetoric of reasonableness. If he were to adopt an 
identity as “they” wish, it would be to enter into the world on their terms and perhaps for their 
benefit: “Ah a nice state they have me in, but still I’m not their creature, not quite, not yet. To 
testify to them, until I die, […] that’s what they’ve sworn they’ll bring me too” (37). To become 
something on these terms would merely bolster the power of “they” and so the Unnamable trusts 
that “my inability to absorb, my genius for forgetting, [will be] more than they reckoned with. 
Dear incomprehension, it’s thanks to you I’ll be myself, in the end. Nothing will remain of the 
lies they have glutted me with. And I’ll be myself at last” (37). This evasion is given its most 
vivid, and one might argue most poststructuralist, form when the Unnamable “is” a tympanum: 
“I’m neither one side nor the other, I’m in the middle, I’m the partition, I’ve two surfaces and no 
thickness, […] on one hand the mind, on the other the world, I don’t belong to either” (100). 
This shared form of resistance between Beckett and Vizenor is, however, not as neat an 
identification as one might wish. The corollary of resistance is some form of continuance and as 
The Unnamable and Dead Voices move towards their ends the imperative to “go on” becomes 
evermore in evidence. There is, though, a difference in pronouns: “I can’t go on, I’ll go on” has 
become “we must go on.” As has been repeatedly shown, the “we” of Vizenor is a crucial aspect 
in the resistance to modes of subjectification. It is the “we” within the wanaki game that acts as a 
form of mediation to the natural world and to the voices in the blood that have been threatened 
by the dead voices. It is a refusal to be captured by a singularity. It is, however, also a 
commitment to a form of the communal, to a social entity, even if that entity is not to be 
identified as a tribe, or a nation. “I can’t go on” is very different. With the first person, two 
possible alternatives emerge: to enter into a social relation (to become a “we”) or to utterly sever 
any such relation and to “be” a not I. The same alternatives do not apply to Vizenor; already 
“we,” the alternatives are to become a “they”—the very thing being resisted—or the 
disappearance of the communal, for the social relation itself to collapse. For the Unnamable this 




is a threshold of absolute aporia: in order to be a non-subject he must adopt an imposed 
subjectivity for an instant in order for it to be then negated; but even that negation would be a 
recognition of its opposite. As such, he is condemned within the space between the I and the not-
I. He may reject the game of identity, but there is no alternative to that game. Ultimately, the 
Unnamable is left in a neither/nor space, unable to go on and yet with no other possibility but to 
do so. This may be Beckett’s final ethical sense of what is possible as resistance: only by an utter 
denial of affirmation can one slip the strictures of restrictive subjectivity. That this entails a 
sacrifice of the social may be the regrettable price Beckett is willing to pay.  
In contrast, Vizenor’s imperative to “go on” is by definition already social as a call to the 
“we.” Thus, for Vizenor, the “postindian warriors create a new tribal presence in stories 
(Manifest Manners 12, my emphasis) and “trickster consciousness […] creates the possibility for 
discourse that’s communal and comic” (qtd. in Blaeser 162, my emphasis). Here might be the 
difference, then, in Beckett’s and Vizenor’s postmodernity. Both deploy a literature of 
dislocation and fragmentation as tools to avoid the restrictive imposition of subjectivity but, for 
Vizenor, this is part of a process, whereas, for Beckett, this is a point of aporetic impasse. 
Against the “simulations [that] are the absence of the tribal real” Vizenor deploys a strategic 
literature of fragmentation out of which can arise “new stories of survivance over dominance” 
(Manifest Manners 4), in what Blaeser has characterised as a deconstructive act with a view to a 
subsequent reconstruction (145). The Unnamable, in contrast, is left before the threshold of his 
story that is not passed, and reconstruction is left in abeyance, quite possibly because any 
reconstruction would merely replicate the structures by which a restrictive identity had 
previously been imposed. Beckett’s ethical response is, then, one of withdrawal and denial; 
Vizenor’s one of continued creativity with a view to an ultimately communal affirmation. 
Maintaining a sense of the social whilst undoing forms of restrictive identity is perhaps 
Vizenor’s most difficult but most important task. Beckett’s work suggests that, for him at least, 
such a task might not be possible. 
 These differences of an asocial Beckett and a social Vizenor might account in the end for 
the very different tones of Dead Voices and The Unnamable. For Vizenor, alongside a serious 
ethical commitment to social continuance, there is a certain joy to be had in the free-play of fluid 
identities. The cards of the wanaki are, amongst other things, a game to be freely played within 




an almost ritualistic set of rules; not as in Beckett, a game one is condemned to play and for 
which the rules are indecipherable. The breathless frenzy of the close of The Unnamable is one 
of desperation that the threshold to the story will not be crossed and the Unnamable will not stop 
talking and fall into the silence he never stops desiring. In contrast, silence is feared in Dead 
Voices, for “our death would be silence” (137). Bagese may be harassed by the dead voices 
within modernity, but the game remains to be played as a possible means of joyously surviving 
those deadening influences and preserving the “stories in the blood” against silence (47). In 
Vizenor’s postmodernity jouissance is a possibility; in Beckett’s it is just a bad joke told too 
often.   
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